What if france attacked germany in 1939

I personally think the French wigged themselves out with the Saar Offensive and then buttoned behind the Maginot Line. If they could have had more offensive minded leaders and used their planes more aggressively then they might not have been caught napping come Spring.

The problem of the french was that their mobilisation was based on the doubling system. That means that each permanent regiment was supposed to provide the cadre for one or more conscript regiment. That means that first each permanent regiment engaged in the attacke means one less regiment at least being ready for defence elsewhere and each regiment being mauled in the attacke means at least two regiment out of order. And in turn this means much weaker army when the Boche counter-attack comes.

SO the French elected to await for their full mobilisation before attacking seriously. According to the expectation of Polish resistance, this should have been possible. Those expectations proved whildly inaccurate and the french structure prevented from making a change on the go. TO said:. Given they declared war only after Hitler invaded Poland, I dont think they were going to be called the aggressors. But the OP says "48 hours before the invasion of Poland", which is actually the day before Operation Himmler which occurred on August 31, was put into place What would happen if 48 hours after the Polish invasion starts, France sends it's army full tilt.

Last edited: Oct 13, As I recall, the French went to war in a horribly demoralized state. Leadership did not want war and did not believe they could win. I dont recall reading that they were defeatist in a way that they thought they would lose in a month either. But they certainly didnt think they would win either. Someone in that mode of thinking doesnt launch an invasion.

I am interested in other perspectives if my memory about French morale is wrong or incomplete. May persuasively argued not long ago, the events of May—June might better be summarized by the title Strange Victory. Although conceding that German air and armored doctrine was better than that of the Allies, he noted that the Allies actually had more aircraft, more and heavier tanks, and more infantry than did their adversary.

As for the notion of some national French malaise, May considers it the worst kind of hindsight. The French troops defending this region were second-rate, outnumbered, and outclassed. The best Allied divisions—as the Germans anticipated—had responded to the German offensive by driving rap idly into Belgium, hoping to establish a strong defensive line east of Brussels, and sending their very best mechanized forces on a lightning run toward Breda in the Netherlands.

The Allies adopted this strategy, known as Plan D, because they felt certain the main German thrust would come there—across the Belgian plain—as had been the case in It took the Allied high command four fateful days to discover their error, and by then it was too late.

German armored columns slashed their way to the English Channel; by May 21 the best Allied troops were hopelessly cut off in Belgium. A few hundred thousand would escape in the famous Dunkirk evacuation; the rest would perish or sit out the war in German POW camps. Yet it requires only a minimal rewrite of history to convert defeat into respectable defense, even out right victory. Until January , Case Yellow, the German operational plan for a western offensive, contemplated a primary attack against Belgium and Holland.

The objective was not to defeat France in a bold stroke, but to establish forward airfields for what would presumably be a protracted war against Britain and France. In other words, the German high command proposed to do exactly what the Allies expected. Everything changed because on the evening of January 9, one Luftwaffe major named Helmuth Reinberger accepted a generous offer made by another, Erich Hoenmanns.

The six infantry divisions of the French 1 st Army provide another good example. The Germans took risks during the Battle of France. They concentrated their tanks in the Ardennes, on difficult terrain, between the Maginot Line and the main body of the French army in the north.

Then they smashed through the Ardennes while the French army had gone north, to fight the Wehrmacht divisions that had gone through Belgium. So they encircled the Allied forces, penning them in towards the English Channel, before heading south towards Paris. That was when the French army collapsed. As we have seen, the French army had plenty of men, and lots of good quality equipment and arms. The reasons for its defeat were intellectual and doctrinal. They were unable to adapt.

The Germans — by contrast — took risks. This article has been translated from the original in French. Daily newsletter Receive essential international news every morning. Take international news everywhere with you!